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Abstract
Based on the ZHAW Managers Survey (7-13 April 2020) we evaluate firm reactions
towards the COVID-19 crisis. We find that the Swiss economic lockdown measures
successfully froze the economy, i.e., firms show very little pro-active reactions towards
the crisis, but drastically decrease their business activities. The firms in the survey
report that the decline in foreign demand is the single most important reasons for
their deteriorating business situation. The only significant pro-active reactions to
mitigate the crisis are increased digitalization efforts. These efforts are expected to
have a long-lasting impact on firms’ performance due to a selection effect, i.e., firms
with more positive experience of digitialization will maintain their higher levels of
digitalization even after the crisis. In general we find that firms that faced a more
difficult business situation before the crisis are affected more severely during the crisis.
Moreover, we investigate the impact of the Swiss federal loan program (Bundeshilfe) on
the business activities of Swiss firms. Specifically, we focus on the take up of firms and
its interaction with the perceived business situation before and during the COVID-19
crisis. To this end, we develop a stylized theoretical model of financially constrained
heterogeneous firms. We find that policy makers face a trade-off between immediate
higher unemployment rates and long-term higher public spending. The former arises
from a combination of a too strong economic impact of the COVID-19 lockdown and
too low levels of loans provided by the government to financially distressed firms.
Nevertheless, providing (too) high levels of loans to firms might create zombie firms
that are going to default on their debt in the future leading to an increase in public
spending.
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1 Introduction
The COVID-19 crisis does not only represents great challenges to local healthcare systems,
but also puts many companies and organizations to a hard test. The arising problems are
numerous and often unprecedented. This implies that during the COVID-19 crisis firms
face an existential threat and might often fight for the survival of their business. Policy
makers face the most severe crisis since 1930s great depression. Common economic policy
instruments are untested in this special situation, thus it becomes even more important to
understand the firm-level behavior by using theoretical models and empirical analysis.
In this paper we investigate the impact of the COVID-19 crisis on Swiss firms by combining
empirical findings from the ZHAW managers barometer survey with a stylized theoretical
model. The contribution of the study is twofold. First, we analyze the expectation and
actions of firms during the crisis in detail. To this end, we also consider firm-level responses
such as short-time work or digitalization efforts that could mitigate economic impact of the
COVID-19 crisis on firms. Second, we develop a stylized model of financially constraint firms
along the lines of Manova (2013) and Chaney (2016) that specifically focuses on guaranteed
loans for firms by the (Swiss) government to support financially distressed firms during the
crisis.
we find that the COVID-19 crisis dramatically impacts Swiss firms: the perceived busi-
ness situation deteriorates from ”Good” to ”Neutral” at the median between 2019 and the
expected peak economic impact of the COVID-crisis. This is mainly driven by a strong
decline of foreign demand. Moreover, firms that faced a less favorable pre-crisis business
situation expect a much stronger impact of the COVID-19 crisis. This is consistent with
the findings of Buchheim et al. (2020) for German firms. The Swiss firms in our survey
expected the peak economic impact of the COVID-19 crisis by mid July 2020 and a return
to a (new) normal situation by the end of 2020. Given this rather short time horizon it is
not a surprise that most firms are not changing their business model dramatically. In this
sense the efforts to ”freeze” the Swiss economy seemed to have worked. Still we observe a
persistent long-run effect in the area of digitalization. Specifically home office is expected to
increase significantly, i.e., almost 9 percentage point relative to pre-crisis levels or on average
an additional half-day of home office for employees. Most of the observed firm reactions are
aiming at keeping the business operating at a minimal costs, i.e., using short-time work and
guaranteed loans by the federal government. In the public opinion providing government
loans at very favorable terms to private companies is often seen critical. These loans could
distort the market mechanism and keep firms (artificially) alive, although their business
situation would not allow it. Caballero et al. (2008) coined the term zombie firms for these
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kind of firms, when analyzing the Japanese firms in the 1990s.1 Empirically, we find that
the probability to take up these guaranteed loans increases with the perceived pre-crisis
business situation, i.e., firms that were doing well before the crisis are more likely to use the
Swiss federal loans. This implies that the Swiss federal loan program is not creating zombie
firms at a large scale, but some firms (with a worse pre-crisis business situation) might ac-
tually fear the over-indebtedness due to the additional loans. We develop a stylized model
of financially constraint firms that is consistent with these empirical findings. In the model
policy makers simultaneously decide about the economic impact, i.e., the level of (economic)
lockdown measures, and the extent of guaranteed loans provided to firms. In a normative
sense, both should be positively related: a more severe economic lockdown should be accom-
panied by higher levels of guaranteed loans. Additionally, we find that policy makers face a
trade-off between increasing unemployment during the crisis and higher public spending in
the long-run due to over-indebted firms defaulting after the crisis. If guaranteed loans are
under-supplied relative to the economic lockdown measures, firms will not be able to cover
their fixed operational costs during the crisis and hence become insolvent leading to higher
unemployment rates. Specifically, if firms are not able to roll-over their debt, they would
need a productivity gain in the future (relative to the market) to repay their debt. This
creates a wedge between firms that were profitable before the crisis and firms that are able
to repay their debt.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly summarizes the related literature. In
section 3 we develop a model of financial constrained firms and their reaction during an eco-
nomic downturn. Section 4 presents stylized facts (based on the ZHAW managers barometer
survey) about the economic impact of the COVID-19 crisis on Swiss firms. Moreover, we
show that the key model predicts are consistent with the empirical findings for Swiss firms.
Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 Literature
The recent research in economics is focusing heavily on the economic impact of COVID-19.
Most of these analyses are theoretical and often have interdisciplinary aspects by combining
standard epidemiological models (Kermack and McKendrick, 1927; Ferguson et al., 2020)
with macroeconomic models, see for example Eichenbaum et al. (2020) or Guerrieri et al.
(2020) on the interplay epidemic and economics. While these papers take a macroeconomic
perspective, others have focused more on the firm-level reactions. Bloom et al. (2019), Bar-
tik et al. (2020), Bru¨lhart et al. (2020), and Buchheim et al. (2020) look at firms’ reaction
1More recently, McGowan et al. (2017) and McGowan et al. (2018) have shown that the share of such
companies (the zombie share) has increased significantly in the wake of the 2007 financial crisis across
advanced economies. Thus, one might expect a similar situation during the COVID-19 crisis.
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towards COVID-19 in the UK, USA, Switzerland, and Germany respectively.2 Buchheim et
al. (2020) is one of the few studies looking at firm expectations, which are very important
in a situation with increased uncertainty, see Binder (2020) and Dietrich et al. (2020) for
individual expectations.
The two main economic policy instruments used during the crisis in Switzerland are short-
time work and guaranteed loans to firms, see Eichenauer and Sturm (2020). short-time work
should help to maintain employee and employer matches. Once a match is resolved unem-
ployment can be very persistent and have a lasting negative impact on earnings of dismissed
workers, see Hamermesh (1989), Gregory and Jukes (2001), and Burda and Mertens (2001).
Moreover, the possible loss of firm-specific knowledge might lead to even more negative long-
run effects as described by Pissarides (1992) and Edin and Gustavsson (2008). short-time
work has proved to be an effective tool to mitigate negative labor market effects during an
economic crisis: Kopp and Siegenthaler (2018) show that this was specifically the case for
Switzerland during and after the financial crisis. While short-time work is perceived rather
positive, loans to struggling firms are often seen much more critical. It is argued that these
loans could distort the market mechanism and keep firms (artificially) alive although their
business situation would not allow it. This firms can be seen as zombie firms (Caballero et
al., 2008). These firms are in general less productive and might crowd out growth of more
productive firms by locking resources, which Banerjee and Hofmann (2018) call congestion
effects. They also find that zombie firms decrease employment growth.
In terms of the proposed theory model, we follow closely Manova (2013) and Chaney (2016),
but adjust their model to a country in autarky and the Swiss institutional setup.
3 Model
In this section we develop a simple model of financially constrained firms. To this end, we
adapt the standard model of Manova (2013) to the specific setting of Swiss federal loan
program for firms during the COVID-19 crisis. Specifically, collateral for the Swiss federal
loans is zero as well as the interest rate. The central government guarantees credits up to
CHF 500,000, and firms could apply for these loans at their local bank without any collateral
and only a minimal administrative burden. The credit contract is fully enforceable for the
local bank as the federal government guarantees the loan.
In our model we consider three periods: (i) a pre-crisis period, which we take as benchmark,
(ii) a crisis period, in which the demand for goods has dropped relative to the benchmark
period, and (iii) a post-crisis or ”new normal” period, in which demand for goods has re-
2Bru¨lhart et al. (2020) focuses exclusively on self-employed individuals in Switzerland.
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turn to previous levels.3 Firms are heterogeneous as in Chaney (2008) version of the Melitz
(2003) model.4
We rely on three main assumptions throughout the stylized model. First, the economic
downturn due to COVID-19 is caused by a decline of demand and is not a supply shock.
This is broadly consistent with Baqaee and Farhi (2020) and Guerrieri et al. (2020) who
show that an initial supply shock can trigger a demand shock that is much bigger than
the initial shock itself. Second, while the demand during the crisis is lower for all firms
in our model, the demand after the crisis will be equal to the demand before the crisis.5
Third, firms that at any point in time are not able to finance their fixed operational costs
are insolvent and hence bankrupt. In this case a firm will not take up any additional credit
to partially cover its fixed costs. This assumption is inline with Swiss bankruptcy laws,
although the delay of a firm’s bankruptcy is not a crime in itself, but knowingly worsen the
over-indebtedness of the firm makes the person liable (even with their private wealth and
income).
3.1 Utility
The representative individual in the economy has an upper tier Cobb-Douglas utility func-
tion with share parameter λ. At the lower level the representative individual has CES
(constant elasticity of substitution) preferences over a continuum of goods, q(ω), within the
set of goods Ω, and a linear utility over a homogeneous good q0 produced in an outside
sector. This outside good, used as the numeraire, is produced under constant returns to
scale. Thus, the individual utility is given by
u = q
1−λj
0
(∫
ω∈Ω
q(ω)α dω
)λj
α
, (1)
where ǫ = 1/(1 − α) > 1 is the constant elasticity of substitution. We use the upper
tier Cobb-Douglas share parameter, λj, to introduce a demand shock in our model. λj
can be seen as a (relative) demand shifter for all differentiated goods. We assume that
0 < λC ≤ λN = λB < 1, where j = B indicates before crisis values, j = C indicates the
values during the economic downturn, and j = N after crisis (new normal) values. The pre-
and post-crisis demand shifters are equal by assumption. Alternatively, we could use also
an exogenous preference parameter within the CES utility function, which varies between
all goods in the set ω. Using the exogenous preference shifter within the CES sub-utility
3As the credit does not bear any interest rate, we assume that the intertemporal discount rate is zero,
which simplifies the model considerably.
4The Chaney (2008) model offers a great simplification to analyze the extensive margin adjustments,
without fully considering wage adjustments.
5This assumption could be relaxed, but this would introduce a wide variety of different scenarios to the
model that add very little in terms of the model intuition.
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function is idiosyncratic to a productivity shock for the firm producing the respective va-
riety. In this model we aim at modeling a demand side shock and hence the upper tier
utility share parameter is more appropriate. Changes in the share parameter reflect shifts
of the individual expenditures towards or away from the differentiated goods.6 We do not
differentiate between different sectors as this would only complicate the notation and add
little to the model.7
The representative individual maximizes her CES sub-utility subject to the (residual) budget
constraint
λjY =
∫
ω∈Ω
p(ω)q(ω) dω, (2)
where Y are the expenditures of the representative individual and p(ω) is the price of a
good ω. The demand for a good q(ω, λj) is given by
qj(ω, λj) =
p(ω)−ǫλjY
P 1−ǫ
, (3)
where
P =
(∫
ω∈Ω
p(ω)1−ǫ dω
) 1
1−ǫ
, (4)
is the common CES price index, which all firms and individuals take as given.
3.2 Firms
A firm producing a variety ω faces fixed costs f that are re-occurring each period, see
Chaney (2008). Firms are heterogeneous in terms of their productivity, a, which is drawn
from a known cumulative distribution function G(a) with support 0 < aL. As a is drawn
from a continues function and each firm produces exactly one specific good, we can replace
the good or firm indicator ω by the firm productivity a uniquely identifying the firm and
product. Producing one unit good ω costs c/a, where c > 0 is the cost of a cost-minimizing
bundle of inputs. The profits of a firm a in any of the three considered periods j = B,C,N
are given by
πj(a) = p(a)q(a, λj)− q(a, λj)
c
a
− f +Kj, (5)
where Kj indicates the credit taken up or repaid. Specifically, KN = −KC corresponds to
the repayment of the credit with zero interest rate in the new normal. We assume KB = 0,
i.e., before the crisis firms are not using any credit.
Firms are optimizing their profits considering the demand for goods (derived from the CES
utility function) in equation (3), while taking the price index in equation (4) as given. Thus,
6Individuals might reduce their consumption of certain goods but increase others, i.e., travelling for
vacation vs. buying a new computer.
7See Anderson and Yotov (2010) or Gopinath et al. (2014) .
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the optimal price of a good provided by firm a is given by
p(a) =
1
α
c
a
, (6)
which is the standard constant markup over marginal costs and independent of the actual
economic situation λj.
We assume that there is a maximum take up of credits, KC ≤M ≤ f .
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Firms can only borrow the amount necessary to cover their fixed costs and not any variable
costs.9 This implies that during crisis there exists a cutoff productivity aC > 0 for which
πC(aC) = 0 given the maximum take up Kc = M . Firms with a lower productivity draw
will not have enough earnings and credit available to them to cover their fixed costs in this
period. We refer to this cutoff as the debt constraint.
Using the zero-profit condition, πC(aC) = 0, yields the cutoff aC for firms to survive the
crisis by using the maximum available credit M . This cutoff is given by
aC = (f −M)
1
ǫ−1
(
ǫ
λC
) 1
ǫ−1
Y
1
1−ǫ
ǫ
ǫ− 1
1
PC
c, (7)
Given the cutoff productivity and the following distribution of prices, the crisis price index
PC(aC) can be determined analogously to Chaney (2008), see appendix A for more details.
Next, we consider the firms that do not need to take up any debt during the crisis to ensure
their survival, i.e, there profits are non-negative during the crisis. In this case πC(a˜C) = 0
with KC = 0 defines the viability cutoff for firms during the crisis, which we denote as a˜C .
Similarly, πB(a˜B) = 0 with KB = 0 defines the viable firm before the crisis, and πN(a˜N) = 0
with KN = 0 defines the viable firm in the new normal. The three cutoffs are given by
a˜j = f
1
ǫ−1
(
ǫ
λj
) 1
ǫ−1
Y
1
1−ǫ
ǫ
ǫ− 1
1
Pj
c ∀ j = B,C,N. (8)
If a firm did take on any debt during the crisis, it has to repay it during the new normal
period. A firm can afford to do so, if after repaying its debt it still has non-negative profits,
i.e., πN(a) ≥ 0.
10 Notice that the amount of credit a firm would take up during the crisis
can be written as
8The Swiss federal loan program allows firms to take up higher levels of credit, but in this case they
would need to provide collateral assets. For simplicity we assume that firms are not able take up debt higher
than the maximum M .
9The Swiss policy actually state that the loan cannot exceed 10% of firms total revenues, but loans below
CHF 0.5 million are granted with a minimal administrative burden.
10We assume that the debt cannot be rolled over and unless repaid in full the firm will have to leave the
market.
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K⋆C(a) = max
(
0,min
(
f − p(a)q(a, λC) + q(a, λC)
c
a
,M
))
∀ a ≥ aC . (9)
After substituting the optimal prices and quantities in equation (9) the optimal credit take
up during the crisis is given by
K⋆C(a) = max
(
0,min
(
f −
(
ǫ− 1
ǫ
aPC
)ǫ−1
Y λC
ǫ
,M
))
∀ a ≥ aC . (10)
Using that KN(a) = −KC(a) we can re-write the after-crisis profits for firms that took up
any debt as
πN(a, λN) = p(a)q(a, λN)− q(a, λN)
c
a
+ p(a)q(a, λC)− q(a, λC)
c
a
− 2f ∀ a ≥ aC . (11)
Only if πN(a) ≥ 0 a firm will be able to repay the debt after the crisis. The profits of firms
that did not take up any debt during the crisis are given by equation (5) with KN = KC = 0.
The cutoff condition to repay the debt is given by
π(aN , λN) =
(
c
aN
)1−ǫ
1
ǫ
(
ǫ
ǫ− 1
)1−ǫ
Y
(
λN
P 1−ǫN
+
λC
P 1−ǫC
)
− 2f = 0. (12)
We refer to this as repayment constraint. Equation (12) can be solved for the new normal
repayment cutoff aN and the after-crisis price index PN can be derived. The repayment
cutoff is given by
aN = (2f)
1
ǫ−1 ǫ
1
ǫ−1
ǫ
ǫ− 1
Y
1
1−ǫ
(
λN
P 1−ǫN
+
λC
P 1−ǫC
) 1
1−ǫ
c. (13)
As λN = λB, the cutoff of a firm that is able to repay its debt is aN ≥ a˜B. Intuitively, the
debt carried on from the crisis, increase the necessary sales or profits of the firm to repay
the debt above the pre-crisis viability threshold. This creates a productivity wedge between
firms that are able to repay their debt and firms that could survive the economic downturn
using the Swiss federal loan program. It is this wedge that creates zombie firms.
Note that the viability cutoff in the new normal is different from the repayment cutoff, as
the former only considers if a firm is able to cover its current fixed costs, but excludes any
debt repayments. Given a positive debt level the following relationship can be established:
aN > a˜N . A post-crisis viable firm might not be able to repay its debt. Given that λN = λB
the viability cutoffs must be equal as well, i.e., a˜N = a˜B.
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11This would not be the case if λN 6= λB .
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3.3 The good, the zombies and the ones left behind
We have to distinguish three cases depending on the relationship of different productivity
cutoffs. In the first case, we consider aN > aC ≥ a˜N , i.e., the repayment constraint is bind-
ing for the firm, but not all viable firms have access to sufficient loans to survive the crisis.
In the second case aN > a˜N ≥ aC all viable firms are able to take up debt to survive the
crisis. In the last case, the debt constraint is binding and hence aC > aN > a˜N . We assume
that firms will take up the guaranteed credit unless the debt constraint becomes binding,
i.e., even the maximum amount of credit would not be sufficient to ensure the survival of
the firm during the crisis. If a firm survives the crisis, it needs the resources to repay its
debt, otherwise it would have to default. Last, we assume that the viability cutoff during
the crisis a˜C > max(aj), i.e., the economic downturn of the crisis makes it necessary for
(some) firms to take up loans to survive the crisis.
A priori it is not clear which case is relevant for the economy, thus we will analyze all cases
and derive their policy implications. Figure 1 shows the cutoffs and the resulting four firm
types for all cases.
𝑎𝐿𝜖−1 𝑎ത𝑎𝐶𝜖−1 ത𝑎𝑁𝜖−1
Case 3: ത𝑎𝐶 > ത𝑎𝑁 > ෤𝑎𝑁
Zombies The Good
𝑎𝐿𝜖−1 𝑎ത𝑎𝑁𝜖−1 ത𝑎𝐶𝜖−1
Dying
The Good
෤𝑎𝑁𝜖−1
𝑎𝐿𝜖−1 𝑎
Case 1: ത𝑎𝑁 > ത𝑎𝐶 > ෤𝑎𝑁
ത𝑎𝐶𝜖−1 ത𝑎𝑁𝜖−1
Not in the market The Good
෤𝑎𝑁𝜖−1
Zombies
Not in the market
Not in the market
Case 2: ത𝑎𝑁 > ෤𝑎𝑁 > ത𝑎𝐶
෤𝑎𝑁𝜖−1
Not in the market
Dying Dying
Figure 1: This figure plots the different firm types based on their productivity and the
relationship of cutoffs of the debt, repayment constraints, and viability condition.
Recall that we assumed the viability cutoffs before and after the crisis to be equal, but lower
than during the crisis, i.e., a˜B = a˜N < a˜C . Thus, all firms that can be observed during the
crisis will have a productivity level of at least a˜N , all other firms will not be in the market.
Case 1: aN > aC > a˜N
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In this scenario the repayment condition is the strictest. Three types of firms will be present
in this case.
The good : a ≥ max(aN , aC)
Given the high productivity level of the firm (low costs), the maximum amount of credit
available to the firm is sufficient to deal with the negative impact of the crisis and the firm
will either not need any credit or be able to repay all the debt after the crisis. These firms
use the guaranteed credit as indented. Within the good, there will be some firms with a
productivity a > a˜C that do not need any credit at all during the crisis.
Zombie firms : aN > a ≥ aC
Firms will be able to survive with the credit during the crisis, but they will not be able
to repay the debt in the future. Thus, the guaranteed credit during the crisis leads to an
over-indebtedness of the firm. This would be commonly referred to as zombie firms, that are
kept alive only because of the government intervention. These exist due to the productivity
wedge between aN and aC .
Dying firms : aN < aC < a
Note that in this scenario the repayment constraint is stricter than the new normal viability
condition, i.e., aN > a˜N . Thus, in this case all firms with a productivity aC > a > a˜N would
be viable in the new normal, but have to default as they are unable to finance their fixed
operational costs during the crisis with federal loans. We refer to this firms as ”dying”. For
these firms higher federal loans would not ensure their long-term survival, but these loans
would turn them into zombies.
Case 2: aN > a˜N > ac
As in the first case the repayment constraint is binding, but now a˜N > aC , i.e., all firms
that are in the market have access to sufficient credit. This implies that only good firms and
zombie exist in this case. If policy makers intend to freeze the economy, i.e., this scenario
would represent a situation in which the market structure is persevered during the crisis.
Although, in the new normal none of the zombie firms would be able to repay its debt. To
defrost the economy and keep the current industry structure the government would need
to implement a debt-relief for all firms. Alternatively, firms could undertake transformative
investments to increase their new normal sales, i.e, a higher λN .
Case 3: aC > ac > a˜N
In case 3 the debt constraint becomes binding. The guaranteed credit is not sufficient to
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ensure the survival of the firm during the crisis, although it could repay the credit in the
future.12 These firms are left behind from the federal loan program and are defaulting dur-
ing the crisis, although all of them would be viable firms in the new normal.
From a policy maker perspective two facts are important. First, the level of guaranteed
debt is crucial. If it is too low, the number of firm left behind to die increases. But on
the other hand, a high level of guaranteed credit will create more zombie firms. Thus, it
is important to determine in which situation the economy is, i.e., are more or less loans
needed. Second, all zombie firms could in principle be resurrected by forgiving their debt,
as they are all viable firms in the new normal. This is due to the assumption that λB = λN .
Thus, once the economic situation has improved to previous levels, an ex-post debt-relief
could be a valuable policy instrument. The former situation implies high unemployment
rates during the crisis, while the later leads to higher public spending as the government
covers the guaranteed loans of defaulting firms. Another solution could be possible, firms
could change their business model during the crisis to obtain higher post-crisis sales and
thus be able to repay their debt in the new normal. Thus, the federal loans could be used
to nudge firms to undertake these transformative investments.
3.4 Closing the model
The model follows closely the standard Chaney (2008) model for a closed economy. To
derive the equilibrium we need to consider the binding zero profit conditions for each case
and period.
Table 1: Binding zero profit cutoffs
Pre-crisis Crisis New Normal
Case 1 a˜B = a˜N aC aN
Case 2 a˜B = a˜N a˜N aN
Case 3 a˜B = a˜N aC aC
The equilibrium solution of the model for the pre-crisis and the crisis cutoffs can be derived
analogously to the Chaney (2008) model. The same applies to the new normal in the case 3,
where we assume that there is no immediate new entry in the new normal. In this paper we
focus on the behavior of firms during and directly after the crisis and less on the dynamic
12The situation changes slightly if we allow firms to take up higher levels of debt at a positive interest rate
(and possibly using collateral assets), i.e, K⋆ > M . In this case the federal government is not guaranteeing
the whole credit, but a bank will evaluate the credit application and charge some interest. This implies
different cutoffs, i.e., the bank will demand a higher new normal productivity aˆN to ensure the repayment.
Hence the cutoff for firms will be higher aˆN > aN . This implies that there will be some firms that could
use a higher additional credit to survive the crisis, but would not be able repay the debt in the new normal,
although they would be viable firms, aˆN > a˜N . The bank would not allow them to take up sufficient credit
and some firms would still be left behind to die. Formally extending the model in this regard will not change
the general mechanism and intuition of the model.
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adjustments of new firms entering after the crisis.13 In the cases 1 and 2 the cutoff aN
depends on the past debt level, which is a function of the economic downturn λC and the
associated price index. From the perspective of firms in the new normal this will be an
exogenous (past) additive component for the cutoff value, i.e., the repayment of the federal
loans can be seen as additional fixed operational costs. Specifically, for the case 1 these
additional fixed costs are M for the marginal firm.
Appendix A derives the analytical closed form solutions for cases 1 and 3 in more detail.
3.5 Comparative statics
Understanding the impact of different variables on the cutoffs within the model is essential.
In this section we discuss the impact of the two policy variables: λC and M . By implement-
ing lockdown measures such as social distancing or even banning certain business activities
the government indirectly determines the degree of economic downturn λC . The maximum
amount of loans available for firms are an essential part of the federal loan program.
For simplicity we are only considering the first order (direct) effect and neglecting the (in-
direct) effects via the price indices.
Economic downturn: λC
All other things being equal, a greater drop of the demand during crisis, lower λC , will
increase the cutoff aC to take up debt during the crisis, i.e., some firms with lower produc-
tivity a < aC will not be able to take up enough debt to cover their fixed operational costs
during crisis:
∂aC
∂λC
< 0.
λC does not only impact the debt constraint, but also the repayment constraint in equation
(13).
∂aN
∂λC
< 0.
A more severe recession, i.e., lower λC will increase the repayment cutoff aN . Intuitively,
a bigger decline of the demand for goods during the crisis implies a greater demand for
credits, given the firm level productivity a, see equation (10). Intuitively, if a firm needs to
take up high levels of debt during the crisis, repayment becomes harder. Thus, a lower λC
implies also a higher aN , i.e., only more productive firms are able to repay their debts in
the new normal.
Guaranteed credits: M
13Note that the cutoff for viable firms in the new normal a˜N < aN and hence new firms should enter.
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Providing higher guaranteed credits to companies will increase the debt cutoff aC , i.e., a
greater share of (less productive) firms will be able to cover the fixed costs with a loan. This
ultimately might create more zombie firms in the economy.
3.6 Policy space
In our model it is crucial to distinguish between all cases. In case 3 a potentially larger
share of firms that could repay their debt in the future is left behind to default during the
crisis, aN < aC . Considering the negative effects of job losses see Hamermesh (1989) or
Pissarides (1992), policy makers might want to avoid this scenario. On the other hand, in
case 1 zombie firms are created.
The two policy variables M and λC impact the two cutoffs and hence potentially determine
in which case the economy is. As long as
aC > aN ,
the economy is in case 3, where some firms will not be able to obtain sufficient credit to
survey the crisis, although they could repay their debt in the future. Substituting the cutoffs
from equations (7) and (13) yields the condition for the economy to be in a case 3 scenario:
(2f)
1
ǫ−1
(
λN
P 1−ǫN
+
λC
P 1−ǫC
) 1
1−ǫ
≤ (f −M)
1
ǫ−1
(
λC
P 1−ǫC
) 1
1−ǫ
. (14)
Given that the elasticity of substitution is greater than unity, we simplify the expression to
obtain
λC ≤ λN
(
PC
PN
)1−ǫ
f −M
f +M
. (15)
Everything else equal, a higher level of guaranteed federal loans pushes the economy towards
case 1 and hence potentially creates zombie firms. On the other hand, a stronger economic
downturn, i.e., lower λC , moves the economy in the direction of case 3. One might argue
that a case 3 scenario should be avoided, as (some of) the firms left behind to die during
the crisis would be viable and able to repay their debt in the future, which would suggest a
higherM . On the other hand, ifM is too high it will result in a situation in which aC < aN .
In this case zombie will be created.
If aN = aC , all firms that take up loans during the crisis are able to repay the debt and
no zombie firms will be created. Still, in this situation some firms are left behind to die,
although they would be viable firms in the new normal:
a˜N ≤ aC .
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Substituting equation (8) for j = N and equation (7) yields the following inequality
f
1
ǫ−1
(
λN
P 1−ǫN
) 1
1−ǫ
≤ (f −M)
1
ǫ−1
(
λC
P 1−ǫC
) 1
1−ǫ
. (16)
After simplifying we obtain
λC ≤ λN
(
PC
PN
)1−ǫ
f −M
f
. (17)
These two inequalities determine the policy space for guaranteed federal loans. If the maxi-
mum amount of loans relative to the economic downturn (caused by lockdown measures) λC
is too low, this will create firms left behind to die. If the maximum amount of loans is too
high relative to the economic downturn, zombie firms are created. Figure 2 plots the two
equations (14) and (17). Both are convex and the relationship described by equation (14)
is always weakly below the condition described by equation (17). While the two conditions
coincide at the intercepts of the x- and y-axis they diverge for intermediate values of M
and λC . In terms of our model all λC and M combinations to the left of the blue dashed
line depict a case 3 scenario. All λC and M combinations to the right of the red dotted line
represent case 2 scenarios and all points between the two lines are case 1 scenarios.
This implies a trade-off between leaving firms behind (not preserving the industry structure
before the crisis) and creating zombie firms. If policy makers want to avoid the creation of
zombie firms and hence minimize its costs due to (zombie) firms defaulting on the guaranteed
loans, they have to choose a λC and M combinations on the blue dashed line. If policy
makers want to preserve the industry structure and include all firms that would be viable in
the new normal, they have to choose λC and M combinations on the red dotted line. Note
that the possible policy space gets smaller for more extreme values of λC and M .
3.7 Model predictions
The stylized model of financially constraint firms in a COVID-19 induced economic downturn
gives some insightful predictions of firm behavior.
First, in a scenario of case 1 or 2 for any given level of demand higher productivity firms
will be more profitable before the crisis and more likely to be of the ”good” type, i.e., able
to obtain sufficient credit and to repay it. In the same scenarios low productivity firms,
i.e., firms facing low demand already before the crisis, will not be able or willing to take up
federal loans.
Second, the recession curve matters. The more severe the downtown, the less firms will
be of the ”good” type. Similarly, a better expected new normal situation facilitates the
repayment of the debt and hence increases the share of good firms and decreases the share
of zombies. We can think of the current business situation as the best predictor of the new
14
Mλ C
aC = aN
aC = a
~
N
0 f
0
λC = λN
Figure 2: Relationship between the degree of lockdown, λC , and the maximum amount of
loans to firms, M . Combinations of M and λC below the blue dashed line imply a case
2 scenario. Combinations of M and λC above the red dotted line imply the creation of
maximum number of zombie firms. All combination of f M and λC in the area between the
curves indicate the co-existence of zombie firms and firms with insufficient access to loans
and hence leaving the market during the crisis.
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normal situation, i.e., E(λN) = λB. Thus, a better initial business situation of firms will
increase the take up of debt, while a worse current situation decreases it.
4 Empirical analysis
In this section we provide some empirical evidence that are consistent with our stylized
theoretical model.
4.1 Data
From April 7 to April 13 2020 we surveyed 205 managers of Swiss companies about their
perception and expectation of the past, current and future business situation of their com-
panies. We also asked a rich set of complementary questions about their firm’s reaction
towards the COVID-19 crisis. The collected data cover a wide range of sectors and firms of
different sizes, see Figures 3, 4, and 5
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Figure 3: Distribution of firms by sector. Aggregated Swiss NOGAS classification.
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Figure 4: Distribution of firms by level of revenues in CHF
The detailed descriptive statistics are provided in the appendix B. The complete survey
questionnaire is available in an online appendix.
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4.2 Analysis
Managers were asked to assess their past business situation (in 2019), their current business
situation (7.-13. April 2020) and the business situation they expect at the peak economic
impact of the COVID-19 crisis. While the median firms in our survey assessed its business
situation in 2019 as good, this deteriorated significantly over time, see Figure 6. More
importantly, while in 2019 no firm perceived its business situation as threatening the firm’s
survival (existential threat), this increased to 7% of firms at the point of the survey and
more than 12% of firms expected to fight for their survival at the peak economic impact of
the COVID-19 crisis.
Existential threat
Bad
Rather bad
Neutral
Rather good
Good
Very good
Year 2019 7.−13. April 2020
Expected COVID−19 peak
Figure 6: Whisker plot: Business situation in 2019, at the current point in time and expec-
tation during the COVID-19 crisis. Ratings on a scale of -3 (existential threat
to +3 (very good).
Table 2 shows the unconditional correlation between the three answers regarding the per-
ceived business situation in 2019, at the moment of the survey and the expected business
situation at the peak economic impact of the COVID-19 crisis. Firms that had a more
positive perception of their business situation expected a smaller impact of the crisis. Even
when controlling for industry and MNE fixed effects this positive relationship persists: co-
efficient 0.525 and standard error 0.138. Thus, the COVID-19 crisis seems to have a more
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severe impact on firms that were already under-performing before the crisis.14
Table 2: Correlation matrix business situation
Business situation
2019 April 2020 Peak
B
u
si
n
es
s
si
tu
at
io
n 2019 1.000
April 2020 0.241 1.000
Peak 0.257 0.868 1.000
Correlation matrix of the business situation
in 2019, during the survey (April 2020),
and expected business situation at the peak
economic impact of the COVID-19 crisis.
Table 3 shows the estimation of the determinants of the current and expected business situ-
ations for the firms in our survey. Note that the perceived and expected business situation
are strongly impacted by the foreign demand, i.e., a higher foreign demand improves the
business situation. It appears that firms in a small and very open economy such as Switzer-
land depend to a great extend on the foreign demand. On the other hand, neither domestic
nor foreign supply of production inputs seem to be a mayor issue for the firms in the survey.
There are some weak evidence that firms that prepared more for possible COVID-19 dis-
ruptions - before the first Swiss COVID-19 case was detected - were doing better during
the crisis.15 In terms of specific reactions only offering home office has a positive impact on
the perceived current business situation, but this effect becomes insignificant at the peak
economic impact of the COVID-19 crisis. In general we have to be careful to interpret this
regression table as many variable are likely to be biased due to endogeneity, i.e., reducing
the business activity of course dramatically changes the perceived and expected business
situations, but also might be the result of low demand due to a worse business situation.
The same applies to the usage of guaranteed federal loans (Bundeshilfe).
To construct a recession curve based on firm-level answers we asked the managers when they
are expecting the peak economic impact of the COVID-19 crisis and when their company
expects to return to a normal business environment. Figures 7 and 8 show the distribution
of answers.
As the answer options for the survey participants were ordinal with a varying range and
a right-censoring (more than two years) we follow Wooldridge (2013) and Startz (2005)
and estimate the mean and standard deviation of the distribution and account for the
varying censoring limits by using a generalized tobit model. This allows us to compute
the unconditional mean and the standard deviation in the presence of right-censoring. The
peak economic impact of the crisis is expected after 14.4 weeks (standard error 0.99) and the
14In terms of our model we could interpret the perceived business situation as a combination of the demand
shift λj and the firm-specific productivity, a. Specifically, we could could use a multiplicative function aλj ,
which would be consists with these correlations.
15China reported the first COVID-19 cases to the WHO on the 1 January 2020 and Switzerland reported
the first cases at the end of February 2020.
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Table 3: Estimation: Business situation
Current Business Peak COVID
Problems Reaction All Problems Reaction All
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Ban business activties 0.199 0.011 0.198 0.073
(0.158) (0.161) (0.171) (0.182)
Domestic demand 0.265 0.176 0.151 0.030
(0.163) (0.153) (0.172) (0.168)
Foreign demand 0.433∗∗ 0.378∗ 0.481∗∗ 0.452∗∗
(0.204) (0.198) (0.215) (0.219)
Domestic supply -0.069 -0.145 -0.017 0.020
(0.188) (0.185) (0.197) (0.203)
Foreign supply 0.004 -0.070 -0.102 -0.226
(0.205) (0.193) (0.214) (0.212)
Workers at home 0.007 -0.017 -0.088 -0.134
(0.161) (0.161) (0.168) (0.177)
Finance 0.067 0.083 0.132 0.076
(0.145) (0.144) (0.155) (0.161)
Preparation 0.161∗ 0.033 0.165∗ -0.021
(0.088) (0.129) (0.099) (0.142)
Stop business -1.196∗∗∗ -1.405∗∗ -1.138∗∗ -0.949
(0.442) (0.601) (0.497) (0.660)
Cost reduction -1.263∗∗∗ -1.091∗∗ -1.094∗∗∗ -1.349∗∗∗
(0.301) (0.434) (0.338) (0.478)
Reduce business -0.279 -0.401 0.017 -0.288
(0.291) (0.414) (0.328) (0.459)
Bundeshilfe -1.027∗ -0.912 -1.245∗∗ -0.867
(0.537) (0.794) (0.603) (0.869)
Home Office 1.122∗∗∗ 1.466∗∗ 0.383 0.651
(0.424) (0.623) (0.477) (0.684)
Change of BM -0.237 -0.315 -0.312 -0.999
(0.752) (1.236) (0.845) (1.357)
New products/services -0.371 -0.852 -0.181 -0.386
(0.401) (0.650) (0.451) (0.711)
Digitalization -0.072 0.256 -0.127 0.759
(0.346) (0.469) (0.389) (0.516)
Delivery -1.067 -0.469 -1.077 -0.211
(1.433) (1.737) (1.610) (1.903)
Obs. 104 163 101 104 162 100
adj. R2 .237 .353 .38 .176 .246 .267
Fixed effect estimation of the current and expected business situation. Sector fixed effects
and MNE fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Figure 7: Time a firm expects to reach the peak economic impact starting from the week
7. to 13. of April 2020.
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Figure 8: Time a firm expects to reach the new normal starting from the week 7. to 13. of
April 2020.
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new normal is reached after 39.6 weeks (standard error 2.28). Figure 9 shows the stylized
recession curve akin to Baldwin (2020) and Gourinchas (2020).
5/4/2020 Benedikt Zoller-Rydzek and Florian Keller
Time
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on
Now
Expected peak
New normal
13.41 weeks (std. error 0.99 weeks) 39.57 weeks (std. error 2.28 weeks)2019 (Benchmark)
Figure 9: Firm-level recession curve. Weeks to peak economic impact and the the new
normal. Based on the April 7-13 2020 survey.
Figure 9 shows the stylized economic recession curve. The managers in our survey expected
the peak economic impact in July 2020, indicating that firms were still in crisis mode during
the survey.
In general firms could try to react more pro-actively to the COVID-19 crisis, e.g., they could
move to more digital business models. In our survey the most favored reactions are trying
to mitigate the impact of the crisis, i.e., home office followed by short-time work. Only a few
firms pro-actively engaged the crisis situation and tried to gain market shares by changing
their business model or introducing new products. Figure 10 shows the fraction of firms in
the survey using different actions to deal with the crisis. This indicates that the economic
activity of most firms were actually frozen and no mayor transition of activities occurred
during the lockdown period before the survey took place.
This shows that most firms perceive the COVID-19 crisis as transitory, i.e., once lockdown
measures would be lifted their business situation would return to normal levels. This is
consistent with our assumption regarding the pre- and post-crisis business situations, i.e.,
λB = λN . On the other hand, from a policy perspective a radical change of business models
could increase the new normal business situation for firms and hence enable more firms to
repay their debt.
Digitization is the most important pro-active response with over 20% of firms naming it.
Figure 11 shows development in four areas of digitalization relevant for firms. We observe
clearly that during the crisis digital production, digital marketing, digital sales, and home
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Figure 10: Share of firms using as a response to mitigate the impact of COVID-19
on their business. Multiple responses were allowed.
office have increased relative to the 2019 baseline. Firms expect this to be a long lasting
effect, although at slightly lower levels than during the COVID-19 crisis.
Table 4 presents a t-test for differences in means between expected new normal and pre-
crisis values. All differences are positive and highly significant. While the impact on digital
sales is only moderate with an increase of about 3 percentage points, digital marketing and
communication with customers is expected to increase by over 6 percentage points. The
greatest effect is expected in terms of home office: an increase of almost 9 percentage points.
Table 4: T-test of mean differences
Variable New Normal Year 2019 Difference Diff. percentage points
Digital production 2.214 1.968 0.247*** 4.935
(0.111) (0.108) (0.043)
Digital marketing 2.936 2.628 0.308*** 6.154
(0.100) (0.105) (0.050)
Digital sales 1.928 1.778 0.150*** 3.007
(0.105) (0.101) (0.032)
Home office 1.761 1.316 0.445*** 8.903
(0.073) (0.064) (0.051)
t-test of mean differences between year 2019 and new normal digitalization levels
for digital production, digital marketing, digital sales, and home office.
Standard errors in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
The shift in home office appears to be even more dramatic if we consider the distribution at
the firm level. In 2019 over 80% of firms offered only 20% or less home office opportunities
(maximum of one day a week). This is expected to change dramatically in the future, i.e., we
observe a considerable shift from the left tail of the distribution towards the center. While
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Figure 11: Digitalization shares for digital production, digital marketing, digital sales, and
home office. In the past, during the crisis, and the expected long-term effect. Linearized
scale for answers. 95% confidence intervals.
in 2019 only about 15% of firms offered between 2 and 3 days of home office per week, this
share is expected to increase to almost 50%, see Figure 12.
While in the public perception digitalization is often seen as less effective, specifically home
office, this opinion is not shared by the managers in our survey. The median answer regarding
the performance of digital relative to traditional methods is neutral. Even about 5% of firms
believe that the digital tools deliver better or much better results.
The development we observe in Figure 11 is driven by a selection effect. Now all firms are
forced to rely more on digital tools, but some will return to traditional approaches in the
future. The long-term higher levels of digitalization is driven by firms that have a more
positive experience during the crisis. This is consistent with the fixed effects regression
results presented in Table 5. Firms that experience a more positive effect of digitalization
are expecting a greater positive change of digital production, digital sales, and home office
in the long-run. For example, a firm that has a slightly better experience of digital solutions
in contrast to one that sees no change (neutral) will have on average a 3.2 percentage point
higher level of home office.16 This finding is also consistent with the estimates presented in
Table 3. While having workers at home and not at the work place was not perceived as a
significant problem for for the surveyed firms, home office actually helped to mitigate the
160.162× 0.20 = 0.032.
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Figure 12: Distribution of firms by the share of home office offered pre-crisis (2019) and
expected in the new normal.
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Figure 13: Do digital solutions such as digital marketing or home office give better results
than traditional solutions?
impact of the crisis in the short-term.
Last, we are investigating the take up of the Swiss federal guaranteed loan program. The
theoretical model in section 3 predicted that firms with a better business situation are more
likely to take up loans during the crisis, while firms in a worse business situation would be
over-indebted with the federal loans and hence would not take up any debt. Table 6 shows
the estimation results of a linear probability model. Clearly the business situation in 2019
has a positive impact on the probability to take up federal loans. Also a more severe drop
in the business situation between 2019 and the time of the survey leads to a higher take up
probability, see column (4) in Table 6. These results are only consistent with case 1 and
case 3 scenarios, as in case 2 all firms in the market would take up credits.
Table 7 shows the estimation results of a linear probability model with an indicator for
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Table 5: Estimation: Long-run digitization effect
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Difference Difference Difference Difference
digital production digital marketing digital sales home office
Employees 0.039 -0.096 -0.052 0.048
(0.062) (0.076) (0.050) (0.078)
Revenues -0.080 0.126∗ 0.049 -0.000
(0.061) (0.074) (0.049) (0.076)
Digital improvement 0.122∗∗∗ -0.006 0.066∗ 0.162∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.057) (0.038) (0.059)
Obs. 135 137 136 137
adj. R2 .234 .323 .376 .353
Notes: Fixed effect regression of differences between new normal and year 2019 share of
digital production, digital marketing, digital sales, and home office. Sector fixed effects.
Standard errors in parenthesis. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%,
and 10% level, respectively.
Table 6: Estimation: Federal loan take up
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Employees 0.026 0.041 0.046 0.044
(0.031) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
Revenues -0.049 -0.059 -0.057 -0.053
(0.030) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037)
Domestic demand -0.031 -0.016 -0.015
(0.021) (0.022) (0.022)
Foreign demand -0.017 0.000 0.005
(0.025) (0.026) (0.025)
Business situation 2019 0.042∗∗ 0.039 0.055∗∗
(0.021) (0.025) (0.026)
Business situation now -0.020
(0.028)
Business situation peak -0.017
(0.025)
Diff. business 2019 and now 0.041∗∗∗
(0.015)
Diff. business now and peak 0.017
(0.025)
Obs. 169 132 130 130
R2 .233 .151 .192 .189
Notes: Linear probability model. Sector fixed effects and MNE fixed
effects. Firm level controls are included. Standard errors in parenthesis.
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
level, respectively.
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Table 7: Estimation: short-time work take up
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Employees 0.016 0.059 0.067 0.077
(0.055) (0.066) (0.065) (0.065)
Revenues 0.017 -0.024 -0.020 -0.038
(0.054) (0.065) (0.064) (0.064)
Domestic demand -0.053 -0.018 -0.021
(0.036) (0.037) (0.038)
Foreign demand -0.101∗∗ -0.066 -0.090∗∗
(0.043) (0.045) (0.044)
Business situation 2019 -0.034 -0.044 -0.015
(0.037) (0.044) (0.044)
Business situation now -0.078
(0.048)
Business situation peak 0.001
(0.043)
Diff. business 2019 and now 0.057∗∗
(0.026)
Diff. business now and peak -0.003
(0.044)
Obs. 169 132 130 130
R2 .234 .323 .376 .353
Notes: Linear probability model. Sector fixed effects and MNE fixed
effects. Firm level controls are included. Standard errors in parenthesis.
∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%
level, respectively.
short-time work in the firm as dependent variable. In contrast to Table 6 the business
situation in 2019 does not have any impact on the use of short-time work in the firm, see
columns (1) to (3). As short-time work is financed through the unemployment insurance
of the workers, no (long-term) financial risk arises for the firms. This favors the usage
of short-time work by all firms independent of their past business situation. Although in
column (4) we observe a significant positive impact of the change of business situation on
short-time work indicating that short-time work is likely to be used to reduce business ac-
tivities. In a sector fixed effect regression reducing the business activity during the crisis is
positively linked to short-time work: coefficient 0.161 and standard error 0.078. In terms of
our model we could interpret short-time work as a way to reduce fixed costs of production, f .
In the appendix C we provide estimation results of a probit model for tables 6 and 7 as a
robustness check.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we developed a stylized model of financially constraint firms during the COVID-
19 crisis. Firms are able to take up debt guaranteed by the (Swiss federal) government to pay
for fixed costs during the crisis. We find that three scenarios are possible. First, the amount
of guaranteed loans is too low to cover all firms that would be viable or even able to repay
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the debt after the crisis. This would lead to many firms leaving the market and potentially
high unemployment rates during the crisis. Second, the guaranteed loans are more than
sufficient for all firms to cover their fixed operational costs, but not all firms will be able
to pay back their debt after the crisis. In this case the loans will create a large amount of
zombie firms in the economy that would default after the crisis due to their high levels of
debt. These could be resurrected with an ex-post debt relief. Nevertheless, firms defaulting
or providing a government paid debt-relief imply a considerable (additional) spending of
public resources. Last, an intermediate situation could be possible, i.e., loans are sufficient
for some (post-crisis viable) firms, but not for all. In this case we would expect some firms
to leave the market as credits are not sufficient for them, while other firms become zombies.
It turns out that policy makers face a trade-off between providing large amount of loans
and the degree to which a lockdown is worsening the business situation.
In general even a loan with a zero interest rate creates a repayment wedge and can lead
to over-indebtedness of firms. Two possible solutions arise to this problem. First, the gov-
ernment could use an ex-post debt-relief to avoid zombie firms defaulting. Second, loans
could be conditioned on changes of the business model, i.e., they cannot be exclusively used
to cover fixed costs, but to make transformative changes that enable the firm to generate
higher profits in the future and hence to repay its debt.17
We use a firm-level survey of Swiss managers to confirm our model predictions. Specifically,
we find that firms that faced a favorable business situation before the crisis are more likely
to take up loans during the COVID-19 crisis. This implies that the Swiss economy is likely
to be in a situation similar to case 1 in Figure 1. By adjusting the lockdown or the amount
of guaranteed loans policy makers would be able to change the share of zombie firms and
firms leaving the market. In this sense the policy makers have a trade-off between higher
unemployment rates during the crisis and higher public spending after the crisis due to firms
defaulting in their loans or an ex-post debt relief.
We also analyse firm level responses during the COVID-19 crisis in more detail. We observe
that during our survey most firms were still in a reactive crisis mode. Firms were not pro-
actively changing their business model but tried to minimize costs by reducing their business
activities or using short-time work. Only in the area of digitalization we find some long-
term reactions. In the new normal firms will use more digital tools and specifically much
more home office than before the COVID-19 crisis. In the light of the possible presence of
zombie firms the firm-level responses seem to be insufficient to be able to generate long-term
higher profits after the COVID-19 crisis. This would imply that the government only delays
unemployment or is willing to finance a debt-relief for zombie firms.
17Note that in our stylized model the business situation before and after the crisis are identical.
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A Equilibrium price indices and aggregated profits
To derive the equilibrium we follow Chaney (2008) for an economy in autarky, but allowing
for a variable share parameter of the upper tier utility function. We assume that the
productivity a is Pareto distributed with an minimum aL and a shape parameter γ > 0.
The cutoffs derived in section 3. As in Chaney (2008) we assume that the mass of potential
firms in the economy is proportional to the (exogenously) given population L in the economy.
The price index in the economy in state j = B,C,N is given by
P 1−ǫj = L
∫
∞
ζ
p(a)1−ǫdG(a), (18)
= L
∫
∞
ζ
(
ǫ− 1
ǫ
a
c
)ǫ−1
dG(a), (19)
= L
γ
γ − (ǫ− 1)
(
ǫ− 1
ǫ
1
c
)ǫ−1
ζǫ−1−γ, (20)
where ζ is the productivity cutoff for the corresponding state and case for firms to be present
in the market as shown in table 1, i.e., a˜N , aC , and aN .
Substituting in the expression for the productivity cutoff and rearranging we can obtain the
equilibrium solution for the price index as
P 1−ǫj = κ1L
−
1
ǫ−1 θ, (21)
where θ−γ = ρ(ζ)−(
γ
ǫ−1
−1) and κ1 =
(
ǫ
λj
) 1
ǫ−1 ( ǫ
ǫ−1
) (
1 + Π
L
)
. ρ is a function of ζ, which is
either f +M or f −M if ζ = aN or ζ = aC , respectively. To this end, we discard case
2, as a too high level of available credits is not very likely.18 Moreover, this facilitates the
derivation of the cutoffs and equilibrium price indices. Specifically, only the cutoffs aC , and
aN are relevant. For these cutoffs the marginal firm always takes up the maximum amount
of debt, M . This implies that equation (11) simplifies to
πN(a, λN) = p(a)q(a, λN)− q(a, λN)
c
a
− (f +M). (22)
Now the solution of the model follows exactly Chaney (2008).
r(a) = κ2θ
ǫ−1aǫ−1 ifa ≥ ζ, (23)
and zero otherwise. Where κ2 = ǫ
(
ǫ
λj
γ
γ−(ǫ−1) 1
1+κ3
)1−ǫ
and κ3 =
λj(ǫ−1)
γǫ−λj(ǫ−1)
. The aggregate
profits Π are given by the marked-up average revenues multiplied by the number of firms in
18Excluding case 2 seems to be justified based on the empirical findings in section 4. In case 2 we expect
to observe a general up take of federal loans, and no firm being in a situation that would lead to immediate
bankruptcy.
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the market. This can be written in terms of exogenous parameters and the population size
of the economy.
Π = κ3L. (24)
Clearly, aggregate profits increase with the share parameter of the upper tier utility function,
λj, i.e., a better economic situation raises the aggregated profits in the economy.
B Descriptive statistics
32
Table 8: Descriptive statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Revenues 193 3.51 1.83 1 6
Employees 205 4.06 1.72 1 6
Business situation 2019 189 2.11 1.04 -1 3
Business situation April 2020 189 0.5 1.9 -3 3
Expected business situation 189 0.06 1.98 -3 3
Ban of business activities 154 2.82 1.5 1 7
Domestic demand 170 2.95 1.34 0 8
Foreign demand 145 3.06 1.17 1 7
Domestic supply 152 3.81 1.19 1 7
Foreign supply 152 3.2 1.16 1 7
Worker not at work place 176 3.7 1.22 1 7
Financial problems 164 3.43 1.5 1 7
Preparedness 175 3.34 1.56 1 6
Stop business activities 183 0.14 0.35 0 1
Cost reduction or short-time work 183 0.36 0.48 0 1
Reduce business activities 183 0.3 0.46 0 1
Bundeshilfe or credits 183 0.08 0.27 0 1
Home office 183 0.85 0.36 0 1
Change of business model 181 0.06 0.23 0 1
New products or services 181 0.13 0.34 0 1
Digitalization 181 0.23 0.42 0 1
Delivery 181 0.02 0.15 0 1
Expected peak timing 189 2.42 1.11 1 5
Expected new normal timing 191 3.73 1.19 1 6
Digital production 2019 155 1.97 1.34 1 5
Digital production April 2020 156 2.38 1.56 1 5
Digital production future 155 2.21 1.38 1 5
Digital marketing 2019 156 2.63 1.31 1 5
Digital marketing April 2020 156 3.19 1.41 1 5
Digital marketing future 156 2.94 1.25 1 5
Digital sales 2019 153 1.78 1.25 1 5
Digital sales April 2020 153 2.01 1.43 1 5
Digital sales future 153 1.93 1.3 1 5
Home office 2019 155 1.32 0.8 1 5
Home office April 2020 156 3.24 1.47 1 5
Home office future 155 1.76 0.91 1 5
Digital improvement 144 3.82 0.95 1 7
Descriptive statistics of variables used. The survey questions are available
in an online appendix.
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C Robustness: Probit estimations
Estimation of an probit model.
Table 9: Estimation: Federal loan take up
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Employees 0.249 0.513 0.870∗ 0.837∗
(0.323) (0.358) (0.449) (0.473)
Revenues -0.455 -0.662∗ -0.983∗∗ -0.955∗
(0.342) (0.393) (0.472) (0.494)
Domestic demand -0.299 -0.126 -0.130
(0.191) (0.180) (0.183)
Foreign demand -0.260 0.122 0.089
(0.225) (0.246) (0.253)
Business situation 2019 0.389∗ 0.319 0.433∗
(0.229) (0.225) (0.227)
Business situation now -0.067
(0.218)
Business situation peak -0.440∗∗
(0.211)
Diff. business 2019 and now 0.477∗∗∗
(0.153)
Diff. business now and peak 0.416∗
(0.216)
Obs. 117 93 91 91
Pseudo R2 0.244 0.246 0.355 0.354
Notes: Probit model. Sector fixed effects and MNE fixed effects. Firm
level controls are included. Standard errors in parenthesis. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 10: Estimation: short-time work take up
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Employees 0.074 0.291 0.288 0.348
(0.178) (0.228) (0.244) (0.242)
Revenues 0.036 -0.157 -0.105 -0.184
(0.169) (0.225) (0.241) (0.236)
Domestic demand -0.192 -0.086 -0.089
(0.126) (0.126) (0.135)
Foreign demand -0.461∗∗ -0.328∗ -0.410∗∗
(0.179) (0.186) (0.179)
Business situation 2019 -0.100 -0.125 -0.029
(0.110) (0.134) (0.139)
Business situation now -0.250
(0.164)
Business situation peak 0.010
(0.143)
Diff. business 2019 and now 0.187∗∗
(0.088)
Diff. business now and peak -0.009
(0.141)
Obs. 164 128 126 126
Pseudo R2 0.192 0.286 0.323 0.311
Notes: Probit model. Sector fixed effects and MNE fixed effects. Firm
level controls are included. Standard errors in parenthesis. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.
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